Well we do know emergent phenomena that occur as abstractions. Probably the most obvious example is a computer program. At a basic level, the computer really doesn't look like it's doing useful work, it just processes lists of rules and stuff, but actually the emergent behaviour is that I am browsing Hacker News. What is the difference between a computer and a rock? Well there isn't actually a fundamental difference, other than that the computer is physically arranged such that it is doing some complicated calculation resulting in this rich UI experience.
I think it's the same with the brain. Why is there consciousness in this brain and not in a rock? Well because the brain is set up to perform a complicated "calculation" and the rock is not. Just like the program's behaviour only exists as an emergent property of the computer's physical state, so does consciousness arise as an emergent property from the brain's physical state.
EDIT: to clarify this is why it is justified to say there is not a problem, but I do not personally find it satisfying
Exactly, you have a handwave. A vague idea that when a system becomes "complex" enough it suddenly becomes conscious. There's no mechanism, no rigor, no cause and effect. With the browser you can chase down every bit through the hardware, down to the quantum tunneling effect dictating what's happening in the silicon and come up with a concrete explanation based in physical laws.
With the browser example, at no level of abstraction does there exist any ambiguity. "Emergent" in that framing simply means we can explain abstracted behaviors in terms of other abstractions. But if you wanted you could drill down to the particle physics and have a complete, rational explanation of the system.
Not so with consciousness, and thus the "hard problem"
One obvious difference between computers and humans is that only one of them is an animal. So far as we can tell, consciousness only arises in animals. This sounds like a truism, but I wonder if using phrases like “complex system“ masks it: both humans and computers are complex systems, and only one of them is conscious, and therefore what could possibly be the difference?
Well, the list of differences between the two is enormous. As the article discusses, some of those differences include embodiment, emotions and moods. So perhaps the “hard problem” is not a philosophical one but a question of detailed knowledge: if we had the ability to drill down to the underlying particle physics of bodies, emotions and moods, plus all the other things that comprise our animal natures, then perhaps the problem would be solved.
To put this another way: perhaps the issue with many approaches to understanding consciousness is that it assumes our animal nature doesn’t matter and that conscious minds can exist abstractly, or even be modelled in silicon. But maybe they can’t be, and so for us to truly understand consciousness we will need to truly understand the body, which we are very far away from.
To sum this up: consciousness, in this view, is not an emergent property of complex systems. Rather it is a fundamental property of animals.
You think your computer isn't conscious? How do you know? Just because it's not demonstrating free will? How many layers of error correction are built into computers to stifle the "randomness" of electronic equipment? Do you think you could still exercise free will locked in a padded room and strapped to a bed with a straightjacket?
There's a difference between knowing, and knowing how you know. I know my computer is not conscious even if I'm not entirely certain how I know. I chalk this up to the fact that, as a conscious animal with millions of years of evolutionary history, it is both beneficial and entirely natural for me to be able to recognize conscious beings when I encounter them.
(It also helps that I know how to program computers and don't view that activity as bringing consciousness in the world. I have children, however, so it turns out that I am — with some help — also able to bring consciousness into the world. The former activity I am both able to do and fully understand, while the latter I am clearly able to do, but don't at all understand.)
I recognize this point of view isn't popular among a lot of technical folks. I get it, I was there once too, but I've come around to a new appreciation for our animal nature. This question — how do you know what is conscious? — is very similar to questions like, "how do you know that that dog is afraid?" The short answer to that question is, "because we are kin". Which is an explanation I find much more rich and satisfying than reductionism.
That breaks down for anything that is not your kin though. "How do you know the computer is not conscious?" does not allow the answer "Because we are not kin". Best you can say is "Because we are not kin, I don't know". The dog example is illustrative of only half of the question.
I take your point, but I disagree: your statement assumes that there are conscious beings who are not my kin (and to be clear, by "kin" I broadly mean animals: living entities that are embodied and show characteristics like intention, mood and emotion). But there isn't any evidence that these exist and there's little if any evidence that they are even possible.
At best, you can put forward a thought experiment that starts with, "Suppose there are beings which are not animals but which are nonetheless conscious." I'm questioning the premise of that thought experiment, however, because so far as we can tell, there is no such thing.
In other words, computers are not conscious because they are not animals.
This may seem like circular reasoning, but not if you take the view that consciousness is a fundamental property of animals as opposed to an emergent property of complex systems.
No, there's no such assumption in my statement. That statement is merely open about what we don't know. Conversely, there is an assumption in your reasoning that non-animals are never conscious, which is, well, an assumption, and not derived from facts.
This creates a blind spot where an area of non-knowledge is assumed to be known about, and rejected out of hand. I have to point out that taking the view that consciousness is a property of animals does not exclude non-animals having it.
Even then, there will be a tussle over the exact line of what qualifies as an animal for the purpose of consciousness, resulting in the need to answer the same generalizations (e.g. intention, mood, emotion) that would allow yet undiscovered but plausible forms of life to qualify as conscious.
Some great points, well made (and apologies for putting that assumption on you, you are correct about that). I think the blind spot you refer to also creates the risk we may encounter consciousness and not recognize it.
I’ve long been of the common-in-tech-circles belief that at some point in the future we will be able to create intelligent, conscious machines. Where my view on this fascinating issue is shifting is that I’m much less convinced that our animal nature is immaterial to this task.
In any case this has been a fascinating and insightful conversation and I appreciate the opportunity to have it with you and the other commenters here.
If we take a human and replace one of their neurons with a silicon chip that exactly replicates its electrical activity, is the human any less "conscious"? Presumably their conscious experience is the same (if not why not?) If the human is still conscious, what if we continue one by one to replace all the neurons with silicon chips in the same way? Where does this thought experiment fail?
My house is made of bricks. I can confidently remove one of the bricks and replace it with a Kleenex box. The house is still standing, it’s perfectly liveable and no one can tell the difference. Now what happens when I replace all the bricks with Kleenex boxes?
At some point, the structure will collapse or blow over. When that happens depends on the order in which you work, and the weather conditions, but the outcome is at least well-defined and conceptually graspable.
Personally I think most people who argue consciousness is an emergent property of complicated physical systems would believe that the machine would still be conscious after replacing every neuron with a chip
Given a sufficiently advanced chip which included all chemical interactions (or effective simulations), why wouldn't they be?
If after the transition is complete we determine/decide they aren't conscious, then we have to argue about at what point the 'hybrid' brain ceases to manifest consciousness, and why. Maybe the organic parts would start to change their prior functionality in response to the synthesized parts... but that would suggest we just didn't have a complete enough model of the neuron and we're back to square one. Once that model is complete, there should by definition be no problem, unless you want to argue it can never be complete, for which you then need evidence to convince everyone.
On the topic of simulating neurons, we might be able to simulate the _static_ structure but neurons also move around and make new connections. This video opened my eyes on how far we really are from a realistic simulation: https://youtu.be/CJ3d1FgbmFg
>To sum this up: consciousness, in this view, is not an emergent property of complex systems. Rather it is a fundamental property of animals.
Or at the very least, it's a fundamental property of the particular kinds of physical systems that animals happen to be, and without understand what that is, we have no hope of replicating consciousness in any non-animal.
This makes sense to me, because consciousness seems to be a question related to brains, which are part of animals, so a really great way to confuse yourself would be to abstract the entire question of consciousness away from the life sciences and then wonder why you're so confused.
> a really great way to confuse yourself would be to abstract the entire question of consciousness away from the life sciences and then wonder why you're so confused
Yes, exactly. Which is a direct challenge to transhumanism because it means that maybe it actually won't be possible to achieve immortality via brain upload, or build general AI (without first solving the life science "problem", i.e. building an artificial body), and so on.
Sure, but was anyone really suggesting that we somehow create disembodied people? That seems to be the other side of the dialectical coin from immaterial souls, which are precisely what most Hard Problem disbelievers deny.
“ if we had the ability to drill down to the underlying particle physics of bodies, emotions and moods, plus all the other things that comprise our animal natures, then perhaps the problem would be solved.”
Doubtful since the medium of our thought is clear to us but impossible to share and difficult to describe.
"If I learn C I would be able to understand the Linux kernel"
It is but a first step, and particle physics/C is the lowest level, we have to understand the complex code written with them and the emergent phenomena.
The problem in your stating (and many others) is that the notion of consciousness has self-awareness is baked into it. It's odd to think that the ability to experience qualia magically occurs for sufficiently complex systems, but it's not odd to think that self-awareness just arises once a system that can experience qualia reaches a sufficient complexity level. Unfortunately, people latch on to the reasonableness of the latter, and ignore the ridiculousness of the former.
Apologies if my language is emotional, I like this debate a lot and get rare few opportunities to discuss it with people who are familiar with all the background. I don't mean to invalidate anyone, I think all camps are equally valid regardless of my personal feelings.
Those same people might say that it is just the experience of "being the computer" rather than seeing it from afar. But I don't know, because personally it isn't an argument I find convincing.
As an aside, I think you have to be a bit arrogant or closed minded to assert that they actually can see the problem. I really don't think my wife is lying or being nefarious when she says she doesn't see a problem. I trust her and others when they say they don't see a problem.
Yes, people who believe that consciousness is an emergent property of sufficiently complicated systems would say that a sufficiently complicated computer experiences qualia and is conscious.
I think it's the same with the brain. Why is there consciousness in this brain and not in a rock? Well because the brain is set up to perform a complicated "calculation" and the rock is not. Just like the program's behaviour only exists as an emergent property of the computer's physical state, so does consciousness arise as an emergent property from the brain's physical state.
EDIT: to clarify this is why it is justified to say there is not a problem, but I do not personally find it satisfying