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To be fair, it seems like a lot of backup systems were (properly) designed to recover data for when a single computer or drive or database fails or gets overwritten or specifically attacked -- but not for an wide-ranging attack where every networked computer gets wiped.

All the stuff in this article is great scenarios to think about (recovery time, key location, required tools), but it's still all at the backup design phase. The headline of "test your backups" seems misleading -- you need to design all these things in before you even try to test them.

It seems like a real problem here is simply that backup strategies were often designed before Bitcoin ransomware became prevalent, and execs have been told "we have backups" without probing deeper into whether they're the right kind of backup.

In other words, there's no such single thing as "having backups", but rather different types of backup+recovery scenarios that either are or aren't covered. (And then yes, test them.)



IIRC in the Maersk NotPetya disaster they had to look worldwide for a domain controller in Africa that happened to be off at the time, but fix and patch it before bringing it online. Restoring from backups would leave you vulnerable if a worm is still bouncing around. It takes a big coordinated effort for larger companies.

Also the article doesn't seem to consider the fact that some hackers are now threatening release, not just destruction. Embarrassing emails, source code, and trade secrets. Backups won't help at all.




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